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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Discrimination in Restaurants
The right to service in a public roadside
restaurant without regard to color might
seem fundamental. Yet, because no state
or federal action is involved - only personal discrimination - food to a traveler
may be refused. So long as such refusal
is a result of business choice by individual
proprietors catering to the desires or prejudices of their customers, no constitutional
right has been impinged and no recoursemay be had to the courts. In Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc.' local
practice allowed restaurant service to Negroes on a take-out basis but did not allow
them to eat inside the restaurant. The continued operation of such a restaurant by
virtue of a state license was held not to
be state action within the prohibition of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1883, the Supreme Court, in holding
unconstitutional the Federal Civil Rights
Act 2 with its provisions against discrimination in such public places as restaurants,
analyzed the position of the Freedman. He
was no longer a "mere child" who "needed
the protection which a wise government
extends to those who are unable to protect themselves," 3 but a legally accepted
citizen. The majority in the Civil Rights
Cases,4 while holding that private discrim-

ination could not be prevented by federal
legislation, recognized that:
Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws
of all the States, so far as we are aware, are
bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply
for them. 5
This simply restated the common-law tradition of right to service without discrimination at an inn bottomed on the
quasi-public nature of the business and the
practical necessity of lodging and meals
for a traveler. 6 The Court did not decide
whether service was an essential civil right.
However, it would seem that the same
reasoning should apply to a roadside restaurant. By literally interpreting and applying the rule to inns and hotels only, the
courts have allowed a restaurateur to discriminatorily select his clientele on the
basis of color without fear of legal sanction.7 He is not an innkeeper charged with
a duty to serve everyone who applies,8
at 25.
6 DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 401, 86 N.E.
5 Id.

527, 529 (1908). The English common law required an innkeeper to receive all travelers at
reasonable prices. 21 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 445, 446 (3d ed. 1957); Hartman, Racial
and Religious Discrimination by Innkeepers in
U.S.A., 12 MODERN L. REV. 449 (1949).

7 Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517,
150 P.2d 773 (1944). See also Noble v. Higgins,
1 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).

Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat.
336.
2

s Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306

(1879).
4 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

95 Misc. 328, 329, 158 N.Y. Supp. 867, 868 (Sup.

Ct. 1916).
s Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 948, 36 S.E.

2d 906, 908 (1946), cited in Williams v. Howard
Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845, 847 n. 1 (3d

Cir. 1959).

6
and, absent statutes, such a practice cannot
be eliminated. Until the patron shows he
is an overnight guest, and not one merely
entering for a meal, dining service may be
withheld. 9
The failure to bring restaurant service
within the ambit of civil rights protected
by the privileges and immunities clause10
highlights the inherent conflict between the
minority's right not to be discriminated
against as a group and the individual's
right to choose freely his associates. The
Supreme Court struck down federal legislation which would have brought class
discrimination by quasi-public facilities
within the prohibition of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 11 Since that time it has been
fundamental that only state action is pro12
scribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
What constitutes state action is a sensitive and constantly litigated problem fac1
ing the courts today. The legislative, 3
5
executive 14 and judicial,' as well as political subdivisions'( of the state are all included within this prohibition. As Shelley
v. Kraemer made clear, racially restrictive
covenants cannot be specifically enforced
because judicial determination is state action. 17 Similarly, police ejection of a Negro
from a private amusement park, although
he had purchased a ticket to the pool facilities, was unconstitutional state action.' s
OAlpaugh v. Wolverton, supra note 8.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. •
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a
discussion of this case, see Peters, Civil Rights
and State Non-Action, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303,
314 (1959).
12 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
14 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
15 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 12.
16 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
18 Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
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Further, where public property was leased
to private interests any discrimination on
the part of the lessee wfs held to be state
action19 and violative of the Fourteenth
20
Amendment.
21
The standard set in Ex parte Virginia
forms the basis for what today distinguishes
state action from mere private wrong:
Whoever, by virtue of public position under
a state government,... denies or takes away
the equal protection of the laws, violates the
constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in
the name and for the states, and is clothed
with the State's power, his act is that of the
22
State.
This standard has, by virtue of gradual
judicial expansion, been held to apply to
areas which in a period less sensitive to
civil rights might well have been considered private domain. It encompasses private agreements "in which the purposes of
the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive terms .... "23 It even includes the
operation of a company-owned town exercising many administrative functions nor24
mally performed by the state.
But, as held in the Civil Rights Cases,
"the wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any . . authority, is simply a
private wrong .... -25 Thus, where a court

19 City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425

(4th Cir. 1957); Department of Conservation &
Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.
1956) (per curiam); Jones v. Marva Theatres,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
20 Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373,
83 N.E.2d 82 (1948). See also Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.Va. 1948).
21 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
22 Id. at 347.
23 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948).
24 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

25 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
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is not required to take "affirmative action"
and maintains "neutrality" - where the
discriminatory action is not sought to be
enforced but merely not prevented - no
breach of the Fourteenth Amendment has
occurred. 26 When the Supreme Court ruled
that the state-appointed trustees of Girard
College, a school established by will for
"poor male white orphans," could not refuse admission to Negroes, 27 private trustees were appointed. This substitution of
trustees who were not officers of the state
and so were capable of administering the
estate according to the directions of the
testator did not impinge on any civil rights
of Negro children. 28 Apparently, the approach is negative: courts cannot participate in discrimination but they are not
bound to prevent it.
The decision in Slack v. Atlantic White
Tower System, Inc.,29 far from being either
regressive or startingly fresh, correctly interprets the law today for those states lacking anti-discrimination and anti-bias laws.30
So long as no state interferes with the
privileges or immunities of United States
citizens no federal remedy is available. The
Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer re-

26 See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Ceme-

tery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), afl'd
by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954)
(per curiam), in which the defendant successfully

defended an action for damages arising out of a
refusal to bury the plaintiff's husband because of
a restrictive covenant.
27 Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230

established the standard that:
The action inhibited by the ...Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.-"'
To avoid this limitation, petitioner Slack
contended that the issuance of a license
to an out-of-state corporation to do business within the state "invested the corporation with a public interest" and its action
in excluding him on a racial basis was
equivalent to state action.
This argument was rejected in Williams
v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant32 because
there was no specific state statute dealing
with discriminatory practices in restaurants. 3a The licensing of restaurants to
serve the public does not burden the state
with the positive duty of prohibiting unjust
discrimination in the use and enjoyment
of those facilities. A license is only a permission to exercise a pre-existent right or
privilege which has been subjected to regulation for the public welfare. Licensing
of a privately owned enterprise by the
state does not establish a relationship making discrimination by the licensee forbidden
state action. 34 To argue otherwise would
make "every licensee . . . 'an administrative
agency of the state' in the conduct of his
everyday business simply because he pays
a tax or fee for his license." 35
The petitioner introduced the additional

(1957).

28 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434,

31 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).

138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
29 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).

32 268 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1959).
33 Id. at 847.
34 Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296
N.Y. 249, 255, 72 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1947); State

30

For a comparison of the various anti-discrimi-

nation measures
AMERICAN

JEWISH

and their

STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

(rev. ed. 1953).

enforcement,

CONGRESS,

CHECK

LIST

see
OF

& ANTI-BIAS LAWS

v. Clybum, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
35 Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra
note 34, at 254, 72 N.E.2d at 698-99.
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element of a possible burden on interstate
commerce since she was traveling interstate. Substantial economic effects were
alleged in so far as the roadside restaurant
was a facility of interstate commerce. In
support of this contention the petitioner
pointed to cases involving interstate carriers
as analogous. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant36 distinguished this very
point by pointing out the distinction between directly engaging in interstate commerce and accommodating it:
[W]e do not find that a restaurant is engaged
in interstate commerce merely because in
the course of its business of furnishing accommodations to the general public it serves
persons who are travelling from state to
37
state.
It also indicated that a restaurant is only
38
an instrument of local commerce.
Yet, the particular restaurant here involved is specifically designed to cater to
transients and is located on a U.S. highway. 39 Far less has been required to suc40
cessfully invoke the commerce clause.
Furthermore, interstate travel has been
held to be interstate commerce within the
41
meaning of the clause.

to do so." 42 The grim picture is presented
of pervasive legislation by which the state
would regulate even purely social areas
including private clubs.4 3 That which is
legislated to protect and enhance the status
of the minority succeeds in destroying the
majority's right of voluntary association.
Plainly put, the position is that:
...compulsory integration is a program by
which some people presume to dictate to
others in which type of environment they
shall live. In so doing, they arrogate to themselves the right of choice of others which
constitutes a fundamental human right inseparable from44the dignity of each person as
an individual.
This insistence on the right of persons
to be selective acts as a brake against a
headlong rush into remedial legislation.
The argument has merit when applied to
a person as an individual; it has considerably less validity when applied to a person
as a member of a class. Certainly, the
right of free and voluntary association
ought to include the right of the minority
to associate with the majority; it must include the right to free access to and use of
public and quasi-public facilities.
Antenuptial Agreements

The right of freedom of association is
presented whenever talk of anti-discrimination measures arises as "a law compelling people to integrate who do not desire

36 268 F. 2d 845 (3d Cir. 1959).
37 id. at 848.
38 Ibid.

Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181
F. Supp. 124, 126 n. 1 (D. Md. 1960).
40 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), where a farmer's consumption of his own
wheat was held to affect interstate commerce.
41 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1, 189
(1824).
39

In order for a Catholic to obtain a dispensation to marry a non-Catholic, an
antenuptial agreement must be entered into
by both parties. This agreement contains,
among other things, a proviso that any
children of the marriage will be brought up
42 Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an.
Infringement on Freedom of Choice, 6 N.Y.L.F.

13, 36 (1960).
43 Legislation, Recent New York City Ordinance

Bans Discrimination in Certain Private Housing
Facilities, 56 MicH. L. REv. 1223, 1225 (1958).
44 Avins, supra note 42, at 37.
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as Catholics.'
In Doe v. Roe,2 a separation action in
which the plaintiff husband succeeded on
grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment,
the New York Supreme Court stated that,
when a non-Catholic wife enters into an
antenuptial agreement3 with her Catholic
husband, such an agreement is both valid
and enforceable. The Court awarded custody of the children to the father, despite
their young ages, thus permitting their continued upbringing in the Catholic faith. In
so holding, the Court noted that the mother's position in refusing to bring up the
children as Catholics was uncompromising.
In nineteenth century England, the
courts refused to consider antenuptial
agreements in awarding custody of children, and applied the principle that the
father's word determined the children's re4
ligion.

1 See

LAW, TEXT &
1061 (1957).
"§I The Church does not dispense from the impediment of mixed religion unless: (1) There are
just and grave reasons therefore; (2) The nonCatholic party shall have given a guarantee to remove all danger of perversion from the Catholic
party, and both parties shall have given guarantees
to baptize and educate all the children in the
Catholic faith alone; (3) There exists moral certainty that the guarantees will be fulfilled.
"§2 The guarantees are as a rule to be required in
writing." Ibid.
2 143 N.Y.L.J. 14, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. June 14, 1960).
3 Unless otherwise specified, whenever the term
antenuptial agreement is used in this text, it will
refer to the promises between husband and wife
concerning the religious upbringing of the children.
4 In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317 (1883). "But
this Court holds this principle - that when, by
birth, a child is subject to a father, it is for the
general interest of ... children, and really for the
interest of the particular infant, that the Court
should not, except in very extreme cases, interfere
with the discretion of the father, but leave to him
BOUSCAREN & ELLIS, CANON

COMMENTARY, C.

In the United States, the rule became
established that the most important element
to be considered in awarding custody of the
children is the welfare of each child. 5 However, at an early date, some controversy
arose among authorities in this country concerning the enforceability and weight to be
given the antenuptial agreement in deter-.
mining what is best for the child's welfare. 6
Some courts avoided the question by adhering to the English rule that the father,
as the head of household, should be preferred over the mother in awarding custody. 7 Other courts have indicated that thewishes of both parents as to religious education would be given some weight," while
still others have stated that a court is prohibited from making any religious preferences.9
Today, generally, the mother has been
the ... power which nature has given him by the
birth of the child." Id. at 334. See In re Flynn,
87 N.J. Eq. 413, -, 100 Atl. 861, 863-64 (1917).
See also Friedman, The ParentalRight to Control
the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARv. L.
REV. 485, 488-91 (1916).
5 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522,
39 So. 641, 645 (1905); Purinton v. Jamrock, 195
Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904).
6 See generally, Friedman, supra note 4, at 498.
7 Hernandez v. Thomas, supra note 5, at -,
39
So. at 645.
8 See Purinton v. Jamrock, supra note 5, at -,
80 N. E. at 805. "The wishes of the parent as to
the religious education and surroundings of the
child are entitled to weight; if there is nothing to
put in the balance, against them, ordinarily they
will be decisive." Ibid. See also In re Butcher's
Estate, 206 Pa. 479, 109 At. 683 (1920).
9 Jones v. Bowman, supra note 5, at -,
77 Pac.
at 440. "[A]s the statutes of this state not only fail
to make any distinction as to religious belief, but
absolutely prohibit any distinction being made on
... account thereof, we cannot and will not give
such evidence the slightest weight in our decision ..
" Ibid. See Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App.
193, -, 127 S.W. 685, 691-92 (1910).

6
given equal rights by statute regarding custody and upbringing of the children. 10 Many
courts, therefore, including those of New
York, can no longer refuse to enforce antenuptial agreements on the grounds that the
father determines the child's religion.
Some courts have adopted the position
that antenuptial agreements are unenforceable because they violate the non-Catholic
party's constitutional rights." One court
reasoned that the upholding of these agreements would constitute a judicial determination that one religion is better than
another, and, in addition, would force a
non-Catholic to support a religion against
his will.

12

A majority of courts have taken the
stand that under no circumstances should
the importance of these agreements supersede the consideration of what is best for
the child's welfare. 13 In Stanton v. Stan10 Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringingof Children,
35 B.U.L. REv. 333, 356 (1955). See, e.g., N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW §81, which provides: "A married
woman is a joint guardian of her children with her
husband, with equal powers, rights and duties in
regard to them." See also N. J. STAT. ANN. §9-2-4
(1960).
11 See OHIO CONST. art. 1, §7: "No person shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship against his consent ..
" In Hackett v.
Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio C.P. 1957), affl'd
150 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 168 Ohio St. 373, 154 N.E.2d 820
(1958), the court held that by sending a child to
a Catholic school the non-Catholic mother was
supporting and maintaining the Catholic faith, and
added: "to compel her now ... to keep her promise ... would appear to be compelling her to support and maintain a certain 'form of worship
against her consent.'" Id. at 479. See McLaughlin
v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 274, 132 A.2d 420
(1957).
12 Hackett v. Hackett, supra note 11, at 479.
13 See, e.g., Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me. 24, 122
A.2d 322 (1956); In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa.
479, 109 Atl. 683 (1920); Pfeffer, supra note 10,
at 360-62.
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ton, 14 where a Catholic party sought to gain
custody of the children or, in the alternative, an order directing the non-Catholic
party to adhere to the terms of the agreement, the court said:
[I]n awarding custody of minor children,
the primary and controlling question is their
welfare.... Parents cannot by contract control the discretion and duty of the court in
determining the question of custody, and
the court may disregard the contract and
award the children to either parent or to a
third party if the best interest of the children requires

1

it. 5

Thus far, New York has taken the view
that antenuptial agreements are valid and
enforceable. Weinberger v. Van Hessen'6

was an action brought by a mother for
specific performance of a contract, in which
the mother granted custody of her child to
a third party in return for the third party's
promise to support the child and direct his
moral and religious education. The Court
of Appeals, specifically directing its remarks to the religious phase of the contract, stated: "No question of public policy
arises out of this phase of the contract.
Agreements between parents for a particular sort of religious upbringing have in gen17
eral been held valid in this country."
In two New York lower court cases
enforcing antenuptial agreements between

14 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
15 Id. at __, 100 S.E.2d at 293.
16 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 420 (1932).
17 Id. at 298, 183 N.E. at 431. Contra, Hackett v.
Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio C.P. 1957),
afl'd, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 168 Ohio St. 373, 154 N.E.2d 820 (1958).
Compare Martin v. Martin, 283 App. Div. 721,
127 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 308 N.Y. 136,
123 N.E.2d 913 (1954) (court refused enforcement of antenuptial agreement, holding that a
child of twelve may decide on a religion himself).
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husband and wife, it was said that since the
Catholic party had irrevocably changed his
position in reliance upon such an agreement, the consideration was sufficient to
make the agreement valid and enforceable.1 s The courts also relied on the great
value Catholics place on the religious training and education of their children, as well
as the fact that the children had already
been baptized as Catholics. 9
In the present decision, the Court followed the precedents of the lower New
York courts by reiterating the doctrine that
antenuptial contracts are enforceable. Ordinarily, because of the youth of the children,
the mother is-given custody, and in order to
enforce the contract, she is also instructed
to raise the children as Catholics.2 0 In the
present case, however, in view of the mother's unqualified refusal to raise the children
as Catholics, the Court, in giving the agreement effect, awarded custody to the father.
This decision, therefore, reaffirms the
New York minority position 2' that this
type of antenuptial agreement is valid and
enforceable. It seems unlikely, however,
that a New York court will ever award
custody of a child to an unworthy Catholic
parent solely on the basis of such an agree22
ment.

It is submitted that the present decision
is sound in giving legal recognition to arrangements so beneficial to the deepest welfare of children, the violation of which
would be morally indefensible.
The Law Against Contraception
The concomitant occurrence of the
widely heralded "population explosion"'
and a decision of Connecticut's Supreme
Court of Errors 2 upholding that state's
rigid birth control statute3 has again highlighted the ever present conflict between
4
advocates and opponents of contraception.
The highest court of Connecticut has recently held that the prohibition against contraceptives may not be interpreted as an
interference with a doctor's right to "practice his profession free from unreasonable
restraint." The same Court had previously
denied the right of a doctor to challenge the

forceable like any other, unless and until its enforcement is shown harmful to the child." Martin
v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 140, 123 N.E.2d 812,
813 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
I Christopher, Population Explosion, Time, Jan.
11, 1960, p. 19; Standing Room Only in the
World?, U. S. News & World Report, Nov. 23,
1959, p. 80.
2

Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508

(1959).
Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1942).
19 Shearer v. Shearer, supra note 18, at 358; Ramon v. Ramon, supra note 18, at 112.
20 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1942). See also Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d
18

337 (Sup.Ct. 1947).
21 McLaughlin. v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp.
274, 132 A.2d 420 (1957); Brewer v. Cary, 148
Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 .(1910); Boerger v.
Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953).
22 "[The religious] prenuptial agreement is en-

3 CONN. GEN. STAT. §53-32 (1958). Unlike other

birth control statutes, the Connecticut law attempts a complete suppression of contraceptive

articles and prohibits the use thereof. "Any person

who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned." Ibid.
4 See Gibbons, The Birth Control Issue - What

Both Sides Say, U. S. News &World Report, Dec.
21, 1959, p. 58.
Buxton v. Ullman, supra note 2.
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statute on behalf of his patients;6 but, in
the instant. case, the physician brought the

7
action not for his patients, but for himself.

The Court stated that as it is not unconstitutional to deprive a patient of the use of
contraceptives, neither is it unconstitutional
to prohibit the prescription of these devices
by a doctor.8 Thus the Connecticut statute
6 Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582
(1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 44 (1943);
State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856
(1940). In the Nelson case, two physicians were
convicted of counseling married women to use a
spermatocidal drug and contraceptive device to
preserve their "general health." The Court refused
to construe the statute as allowing a doctor's exception, and cited as a basis for that refusal numerous unsuccessful legislative attempts to change
the statute. In the Tileston case, a licensed physician sought a declaratory judgment as to whether
the statute made it unlawful for him to prescribe
the use of contraceptive devices for married women in cases where pregnancy would endanger
life, and if so, whether the statute was unconstitutional. The court, pointing out that since the
Nelson decision a medical birth control bill had
failed of enactment in the 1941 General Assembly, said, "The manifest intention of the legislature of this state, to date, for all out prohibition
cannot very well be denied." Tileston v. Ullman,
supra at -,
26 A.2d at 585. The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the
appellant had no standing to litigate the constitutional question, that his life was not endangered,
and that he was not empowered to bring the action for his patients by claiming their deprivation
of life.
7 Under CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-196 (1949), "Any
person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires
or commands another to commit any offence may
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender," the physician would be guilty
as an accessory to the offense prohibited by §5332.
s Although the doctor challenged the law as affecting himself, the Court pointed out that "essentially, there is no real difference in the nature of
the right. The effect of a regulation of a business
or profession is to curtail the activities of both
the dispenser and the user of goods or services."
Buxton v. Ullman, supra note 2, at -,
156 A.2d
at 512.

remains a complete restriction on the use of
contraceptive articles.
Since the passage of the federal Comstock Act in 1873, 9 thirty-four states have
passed laws restricting the sale or advertisement of contraceptives,' 0 with an additional four states and the District of Columbia having statutes restricting articles of
"indecent or immoral use."". While the
constitutionality of these statutes has been
9 17 Stat. 598 (1873), 18 U.S.C. §§1461-62
(1958). This statute makes it unlawful for anyone to deposit in the mails any information concerning birth control or to put into carriage in
interstate commerce any article or thing designed,
adapted or intended to prevent conception. See
also 17 Stat. 598 (1873), 19 U.S.C. §1305 (1958).
This statute prohibits the importation of any article for the prevention of conception.
-1 0 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-213 (1956); ARK.
STAT. §§82-944-50 (1947); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE ANN. §601 (Deering 1960); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §40-9-17 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§53-32 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§250102 (1953); HAWAII REV. Code LAWS §§302A-1-3
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-603, §§39-801-10
(1947); IND. ANN.STAT. §§10-2803, 2806 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. §725.5 (1949); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §21-1101 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §214.190-240 (1955); LA. RaY. STAT.
§14.88 (1950); ME.REV.STAT. ANN.ch. 134, §11
(1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §41 (1957);
MASS.GEN.LAWS ANN.ch. 272, §§20-21 (1956);
MICH.COMP. LAWS §750.40 (1948); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §617.25 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. §2289
(1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.300 (1949); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §94-3616 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. §28-423 (1943); NEV.REV. STAT. §202.190
(1955); N. J. REV. STAT. §2A:170-76 (1951);
N. Y. PEN. LAW §1142; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§2905.32-34 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §435.010
(1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4525 (1945);
S. D. CODE §13.1726 (Supp. 1952); Tax. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 740 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE
ANN.§58-19-2 (1953); WASH. REV. CODa §9.68.030 (1951); Wis. STAT. ANN. §151.15 (1957);
Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§6-103, 105 (1957).
11
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §468 (Smith-Hurd
1935); N. H. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§571:14-15
(1955); N.D. REV. CODE §12-2109 (1943); OKLA.
STAT. ANN.tit.
21, §1032 (1951). See D.C. CODE
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their value and status have been

intent. 1 4 In New York the statutory physician's exception 15 has been extended to

weakened by judicial decision and lack of

druggists and vendors acting upon the phy-

repeatedly upheld under the general police
12

power,

enforcement.
This diminishing rigidity of the statutes

is apparent from an examination of judicial
interpretation. In the federal courts a physi-

cian's exception has been injected into the
13

and concurrently, the law has
statutes,
been read as requiring proof of an unlawful

sician's prescription,' 6 even though contraceptives remain contrary to the public
policy of the state. 1 7 New Jersey, in the
case of State v. Tracy, denied the necessity

of a mens rea for a conviction under the
birth control statute,' 8 but later distinguished that case and allowed proof of a

lawful intent, i.e., the use of prophylactics
to prevent disease, as a sufficient defense. 19
§22-2001 (1951). For an indication that
articles of indecent and immoral use include contraceptives, see Lanteen Labs., Inc. v. Clark, 294
Ill. App. 81, 13 N.E.2d 678 (1938).
12 State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856
(1940); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass.
372, 15 N.E.2d 222 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917); People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918);
People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N.Y. Supp. 682
(Sup. Ct. 1917). But see Note, The Constitutionality of Anti-Birth Control Legislation, 7 Wyo.
L.J. 138 (1953), which implies that only the statutes allowing physician's exceptions are valid and
questions the constitutionality of the Massachusetts and Connecticut laws, which do not permit
such an exception. See also State v. Kinney Bldg.
Drug Stores, Inc., 56 N.J. Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430
(Essex County Ct. 1959).
13 In United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1936), the defendant, a physician, had
received in the mails a package of vaginal pessaries from Japan. The majority of the court held
that physicians who use such articles for the health
of their patients are excepted by implication from
the literal terms of the statute. "It seems unreasonable to suppose that the national scheme of
legislation involves such inconsistencies and requires the complete suppression of articles, the
use of which in many cases is advocated by such
a weight of authority in the medical world." Id.
at 740. See also Consumers Union of United States
v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944). But see
United States v. One Package, supra at 740, where
Justice Learned Hand, although concurring in the
majority opinion, made the following observation:
"There seems . . . substantial reason for saying
that contraceptives were meant to be forbidden,
whether or not prescribed by physicians, and that
no lawful use of them was contemplated."
ANN.

Recently, a lower court of New Jersey held
that the statute's "without just cause"
phrase rendered the law "vague, indefinite
and incapable of construction," and, therefore, unconstitutional. 20 Even the Massa14 Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir.

1933). The defendant, engaged in the business
of handling druggists' rubber sundries, was
charged with the violation of 18 U.S.C. §§334,
396 (1958) (predecessors of 18 U.S.C. §§1461-62).
The trial court had refused to admit into evidence
testimony that the articies had a legitimate and
surgical use in the treatment and prevention of
disease, and that they were to be used for other
than the contraceptive purposes condemned by
the sections involved. The Circuit court, accepting the broad dictum of Youngs Rubber Corp. v.
C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1930),
admitted the evidence and held that the intent to
use for condemned purposes the articles described
in the circular or shipped in interstate commerce,
was a prerequisite to conviction. If the possibility
of a lawful intent were not recognized, the physician's exception would be impossible. See note
13 supra.
15 N.Y. PEN. LAW §1145.

16 People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E.
637 (1918).
17 See Barretta v. Barretta, 182 Misc. 852, 46
N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
18 29 N.J. Super. 145, 102 A.2d 52 (App. Div.
1953).
19 State v. Kohn, 42 N.J. Super. 578, 127 A.2d 451
(Essex County Ct. 1956).
20 State v. Kinney Bldg. Drug Stores, Inc., 56
N.J. Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430 (Essex County Ct.
1959). The reasoning of the court was that a

6
chusetts law, which, like Connecticut, has
no physician's exception, now requires
proof that an unlawful purpose was in2
tended as a prerequisite to conviction. Similarly, Wisconsin has injected the requirement of an illegal intent, 22 as has
Ohio. 23 It is readily discernible that this
requirement of proof makes the possibility
of a conviction under the birth control laws
more difficult. The prophylactics involved
generally have dual functions, viz., the prevention of disease and the prevention of
conception. Since the former purpose is
usually legal,2 4 it becomes doubly difficult
to prove that an illegal intent was present.
Consequently, the chance of conviction is
greatly lessened. 25 Furthermore, the large
number of states having physician's exceptions which extend to pharmacists 26 indicates a greater leniency in the prohibition
against birth control.
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the ever-increasing acceptance of contraception, not only when it is medically desirable to prevent conception, but as a
general practice. Throughout the world
contraception is receiving increased social
sanction, notably in England, Sweden and
27
India.
In spite of the apparent acceptance of,
these contraceptive practices and the criticisms levied at the laws restricting them,
the statutes remain. The purpose behind
the attempt to restrict birth control is accordingly rather vague. In this country protection of public morals is usually the basis
for the passage of the law. 28 Indeed, many

statutes are within the obscenity sections of
the codes, 29 and others refer simply to indecent and immoral articles.30 There are,
nonetheless, specific instances where the
courts have expressed themselves less generally, e.g., "to remove the fear of preg-

These factors are a strong indication of
"just cause" may mean different things to different persons. Any married couple might consider
it just to space children, to prevent conception
because of the wife's health, family economic
situation, etc.
21 Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 316 Mass. 563,
55 N.E.2d 951 (1944); Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 151 (1940).
22 See State v. Arnold, 217 Wis. 340, 258 N.W.
843 (1935).
23 See City of Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App.
355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954) (interpreting a municipal ordinance in accordance with state policy).
24 But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§214.190-240
(1955); ME.REV.STAT.ANN.ch. 25, §114 (1954).
25 Notwithstanding
this difficulty, convictions
have been obtained. See Commonwealth v. Goldberg, supra note 21; State v. Arnold, supra note
22.
26
E.g., ARK. STAT. §82-944.(1947); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §40-9-17 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, §2503 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §39-801
(1947); IOWA CODE ANN. §725.10 (1949); N.Y.
PEN. LAW §1145; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.art. 740
(Supp. 1960).

27 What Other CountriesDo About Birth Control,
U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 14, 1959, p. 67.
On the continent, however, a concern over the
decrease in the number of births has led to an
effort to lessen contraceptive practices, as evidenced by laws in France and Italy. Id. at 68.
28 See Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, -,
26
A.2d 582, 587 (1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S.
44 (1943); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass.
372, __, 15 N.E.2d 222, 224 (1938); People v.
Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 4, 163 N.Y. Supp. 682, 685
(Sup. Ct. 1917).
29
E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§10-2803-2806 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN.

§725.5

(1949);

MINN. STAT.

ANN. §617.25 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. §2289
(1942). That birth control statutes were intended
to be only a part of a movement to stop obscenity
and have remained opposed to contraception only
because of a minority bloc, see Note, JudicialRegulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws,
50 YALE L.J. 682 (1941).

30 D.C. CODE ANN. §22-2001 (1951); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §468 (Smith-Hurd 1935); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§571:14-15 (1955); N.D. REV. CODE
§12-2109 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1032
(1958).
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nancy would unquestionably result in an
increase of immorality." 31 Noble as this
may appear, it is not the natural law objection to birth control. Massachusetts, however, came very close to the natural law
viewpoint with this statement:
Their plain purpose is to protect purity, to
preserve chastity, to encourage continence
and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of
the home, and thus to engender in the state
and nation a virile and virtuous race of men
32
and women.
This appears to reflect, at least generally,
a recognition of the inherent evil of contraception, but it fails to express the evil itself,
i.e., the frustration of the primary end of
the marital act.
If the purpose of the contraception laws
is the preservation of the general morality,
and not.the prevention of the inherent evil
of birth control, allowing a single exception
(the physician's exception) would not seem
to lead to a decline in morality. From the
fact that Connecticut does not allow such
a physician's exception it might be inferred
that the state recognizes the natural law
theory that any interference with the primary end of the sexual act is wrong. The
aim of the Connecticut law is not easily
ascertained.
Connecticut allows an exception in its
abortion statute when necessary to save
human life. 33 The dissent in Tileston v.
Ullman,34 pointing out that the abortion
laws do allow such exceptions,3 5 said:
People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1,6, 163 N.Y. Supp.
682, 686 .(Sup.Ct. 1917).
32 Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass 57, -'
116 N.E. 265, 266 (1917).
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. §53-30 (1958).
34 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), appeal
dismissed, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
35 See, e.g.,ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-212 (1956);
31

According to the theory of the state, it is
not lawful for a physician to prescribe articles so as to prevent conception, in the case
of married women whose health will not
permit them to bear children; but it is lawful in case such women do become pregnant to perform abortions upon them when
36
necessary to preserve their lives.

Such inapparent inconsistency may in reality be reconcilable with the natural law.
According to Aquinas, reason recognizes
the direct frustration of the marital act as
intrinsically evil,3 but may allow so-called
"abortions" in ectopic operations in extrauterine pregnancies,3 s under the principle
of the double effect.3 9 While not attributing
this intent to the Connecticut law, which
permits a broader exception, 40 its reasoning
remains at least generally consistent
with
the natural law. The Court itself, however,
attributes its refusal to allow a doctor's
exception to the birth control section to
repeated unsuccessful attempts in the legisIDAHO CODE ANN. §18-601 (1947); MASS.'GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §19 (1956); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §617.18 (1945); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-301

(1955).
36 Tileston v. Ullman, supra note 34, at -, 26
A.2d at 590-91 (dissenting opinion).
37 See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 11-I, q. 154,
art. 1.
38 KELLY,

MEDICO-MORAL

PROBLEMS

105-14

(1958).
39 See FAGOTHEY, RiwrrH & REASON 85-87 (1952).
The so-called "double effect" refers to the morality of acts having two effects, one good, one evil.
The controlling principles, under which such an
act may be performed are: 1) The act must be
morally good or at least morally indifferent; 2)
The good effect must not be obtained by means
of the evil effect; 3) The evil effect must not be
intended for itself, only permitted; 4) There must
be a proportionately grave reason for permitting
the evil effect.
40 The statutory exception extends to all cases
where the mother's life is threatened. The abortion performed legally need not conform to the
double effect principles.

6
lature to change the statute. 41 And a statement in State v. Nelson that the law prevents illegitimate pregnancies 42 evidences
at least one of the given aims of the statute.
Above and beyond the criticism leveled
at the absence of a physician's exception is
the criticism of the birth control statutes in
general. One objection that is often urged
as a reason for repeal is the ineffectiveness
of the laws to prevent contraception. 43 It is
said that apart from the availability of legal
methods of birth control, 44 "there is little
benefit and perhaps some harm in keeping
a statute on the books that is no longer
being obeyed." 4 5 Nonetheless, the fact that
these laws may be dead letter statutes is no
reason to abolish them. It is well settled
that mere non-use will not serve to repeal
a statute or to render it unenforceable. 46
The laws, as they remain, reflect the state's
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concern with morality and evidence at least
a public policy objection to contraception.
Another objection arises when the increased

acceptance

of

contraception

is

noted as being in conflict with the statutory

prohibition. 47 While factually there may be
truth to this objection, the duty of the state
to legislate is bound not only by the mores,
but by the morality involved. The first requirement of a just law is that it not be in
conflict with a higher law. 48 The natural
law prescribes a divine prohibition against
contraception, and obviously a statute commanding birth control practices would be
without moral force.
Closely allied to the foregoing objection
is the thought that the Church as a "minority bloc" is responsible for the failure of
the legislature to repeal these laws. 49 That
Catholics have played a role in retaining
these laws may well be true, but:

41 Buxton v. Ullman,

147 Conn. 48,

-,

156

A.2d 508, 513 (1959); Tileston v. Ullman, supra
note 34, at -, 26 A.2d at 565.
42 126 Conn. 451,
-, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (1940).
43 "[AJny antiseptic is capable of use as a contraceptive, including vinegar, sour milk, bichloride
of mercury, as well as such proprietory antiseptics as Lysol, Listerine and Pepsodent." State v.
Arnold, 217 Wis. 340, -, 258 N.W. 843, 844
(1938). A Fortune magazine survey estimated
that approximately $200,000,000 is spent annually by American women on contraceptives,
many of them sold under the disguise of "feminine hygiene." See Birth Control, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 647,-650 (1951). But see IDAHO
CODE ANN. §39-809 (Supp. 1959): "Suppositories,
cones, tablets and simple cleansing powders not
classified as contraceptives or prophylactics by the
Idaho department of public health or state board
of pharmacy... may... be advertised but insinuation in copy . .. must not convey impression that
such [products have] contraceptive virtue."
44 The legality of prophylactics which prevent
disease has already been noted.
45
See 23 B.U.L. REV. 115 (1943), where the
Tileston case is criticized.
46 See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 117 (1953).

every person has . . . the civic right to
advance his own cause, to advocate and
attempt to persuade others to his point of
view. One may advocate pacifism, prohibition, polygamy or planned parenthood. If
one is successful, if there is a reasonable
consensus, the laws and even the conven47 See Note, 50 YALE L.J. 682 (1941). The anomaly is further evidenced by the fact that one of
the seven states disseminating birth control information in its public health programs, Mississippi,
has statutory prohibition restricting the sale or
advertisement of contraceptives. Miss. CODE ANN.
§2289 (1942). See Birth Control, BRITANNICA
BOOK OF THE YEAR 165, 166 (1955).
48 See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 90,
art. 4; Cahill, Natural Law Jurisprudence in
Legal Practice, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 23, 30-34
(Winter 1958).
49 A commentary on the Buxton decision attributed the birth control ban in Connecticut to the
stout support of the state's Catholic clergy. It
pointed out that the Catholic vote, 47%, is a
powerful voting bloc. Unreasonable Restraint,
Time, Jan. 4, 1960, p. 18.
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tions of the country will reflect this. 50

If the Church is the sole restraining hand on
the legislative bodies, it is up to the "majority" to exert its force and repeal the laws,
if it wishes to do so. As it stands, the criticism against the Church is not only unfair,
but illogical.
The position of the Church on birth
control is clear. "[I]t is absolutely and
always wrong. There can be no question
of a justifying reason, nor of a 'permission'
for even one act of contraception." ' 5 1 Pope
Pius XI in the encyclical Casti Connubii
stated that "no reason, however grave, may
be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conform'52
able to nature and morally good."
Accordingly, only those laws such as Connecticut's, which admit of no exceptions,
are in strict conformity with the natural
law.53
The prohibition is absolute; it is binding
on all men. That there are those who do not
recognize it as such is undeniable. 54 The
50 Birth Control in Politics, 71

COMMONWEAL

335, 336 (1959).
51 KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS 154 (1958).
"The only possible excuse is a subjective one, such
as, for example, ignorance of this divine prohibition." Ibid.
52 Pius XI, Christian Marriage para. 54 (1930),
FivE GREAT ENCYCLICALS 95 (1939).
53 The absence of a physician's exception is the
sine qua non of the conformity of the Connecticut law. "A doctor may under no circumstances
recommend artificial birth control nor even hint
at its necessity or advisability. To do so would
be to encourage others to perform an intrinsically
evil act. Moreover, he is not allowed to give patients information as to the best methods of artificial birth prevention, nor to purchase for them
nor to insert such contraceptive devices." HEALY,
MORAL GUIDANCE 306 (1952).
54 The possibility of varying degrees of knowledee of the natural law is recognized by St.
Thomas. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-11, q.
94, art. 4.

moral status of a civil law that conforms
to the natural law is clear. 55 The legal status
of such a law, although equally established,
may not be as clear. Certainly, the right
of the state to legislate gives rise to the
duty of citizens to obey its mandates.
The appeal of Buxton v. Ullman is now
pending before the Supreme Court 56 on the
question of the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. The law is indeed in conformity with the natural law,57 yet we must
await the Court's determination as to its
constitutionality. If it is upheld, the citizens
have the legal power to change the law if
their dissatisfaction is great. But as it
stands, the statute mirrors the divine prohibition against contraception.
Developments Since "The School
Bus Challenge"
A recent issue of The Catholic Lawyer
presented a discussion of the problems associated with expending public funds to
transport school children to private or sectarian schools.' The article discussed the
history of this issue, the federal and state
problems involved, and suggested courses
of action to be followed where such pupil

55 The requirements of a just law, according to

Aquinas, are that it be (1) not in conflict with
a higher law, (2) an enactment for the common
good, (3) made by a competent authority, (4)
promulga--ed. Id. a-t-q. 90, art. 4.
56 362 U.S. 987 (1960).
57 Even the solution suggested by the Court in

the Buxton case for those who find it necessary to
prevent pregnancy is in line with the reasoning of
the natural law, i.e., total abstinence from sexual
intercourse. See Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48,
-'
156 A.2d 508, 514 (1959).
' Reed, The School Bus Challenge,- 5 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 99 (Spring 1959).

6

-

transportation is desired. The author, Mr.
George E. Reed, commented on litigation
then in progress in three states which he
felt significant in this area. These cases
have now been, decided.
In Connecticut, the Supreme Court of
Errors ruled that a statute enabling communities to provide public transportation
of pupils to parochial schools was not violative of the state constitutional provisions
prohibiting compulsory support of a church
and guaranteeing religious freedom. However, the statute was ruled to be unconstitutional in that public funds, appropriated
solely for public school use, were expended
for transportation to private schools. 2 In
a second case, the New York Supreme
Court ruled that the expenditure of public
funds for transportation of nonpublic
school children was not violative of either
the Federal Constitution or, by reason of a
3
1938 amendment, the state constitution.
Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that the city council of Augusta
had no authority under its police power
to enact an ordinance providing transporta4
tion for pupils attending private schools.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the first 5 school bus case to reach it. 6
The Court held that a New Jersey statute
providing transportation for children attending nonprofit private schools did not
violate either the First or the Fourteenth
Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
2 Snyder v. Town of Newton,

-

Conn.

__,

161
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In his article Mr. Reed observed: "It [the
decision] squarely holds that legislation
designed to transport children to and from
parochial schools does not involve a violation of the policy of separation of Church
and State."' r , The Court maintained that
since a state cannot exclude citizens from
receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation because of their religion, a state
has the right, but not the duty, to provide
transportation for nonpublic school children.8 In supporting the New Jersey statute,
the Court reaffirmed the child benefit theory
so often advanced by the proponents of
transportation of pupils to nonpublic
schools. 9
Mr. Reed states that although the separation of church and state argument cannot
be successfully raised in a federal test of
public transportation to parochial schools,
proponents of such plans must still satisfy
state statutory and constitutional requirements. Normally, enabling legislation must
be enacted to empower local school boards
to provide transportation to private schools.
Furthermore, since many states limit the
expenditure of school funds to public
schools, special appropriations may have to
be made to avoid unauthorized use of the
public school funds. 10
In relating the history of bus transportation to private schools, Mr. Reed contrasts the situations as they developed in
Missouri and Kentucky." Both states enacted legislation empowering school districts to provide transportation to non-

A.2d 770 (1960).
' Board of Educ. v. Allen, 17 Misc. 2d 1080,
192 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
4 Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153
A.2d 80 (1959).
5 Bolmeier, Legal Issues in Pupil Transportation,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 52 (1955).
6 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

7 Reed, supra note 1, at 101.
8 Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 6, at 16.
9Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 6, at 18.
10 Reed, The School Bus Challenge, 5 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 99, 102 (Spring 1959).
11 Ibid.
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public schools. Both states had school
funds which were constitutionally restricted
to public school use. The Missouri enabling act was declared unconstitutional since
the necessary moneys were appropriated
from the school fund. The Kentucky
statute, on the other hand, was upheld
since the necessary appropriation was derived from general funds rather than the
restricted school fund. Mr. Reed concludes:
"In summary, . . . legislation must be
sought. It must be framed with the state
constitution in mind and with full knowledge that it will be subjected ultimately
12
to a judicial test."'
A Connecticut enabling act'3 was recently tested in Snyder v. Town of Newtown.' 4 In that case, plaintiffs challenged
the state and federal constitutionality of a
statute empowering a municipality, with
elector approval, to provide transportation
for pupils attending a nonprofit private
school. The Town of Newtown, after approval by the electorate, furnished transportation for pupils attending a Roman
Catholic elementary school. The Court,
citing Everson v. Board of Educ.,1 disposed of all of plaintiffs' claims under the
Federal Constitution except for a claim of
equal protection of the laws. The Court
refused to consider this claim since the

12

Id. at 105.

13 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-281 (1958). The
provision reads in part, "Any town ... may pro-

vide, for its children attending private schools
therein, not conducted for profit, . . . any trans-

portation services provided for its children attending public schools ....

The chief executive au-

tho-ity of any such municipality shall, upon petition, . . . submit the question . . . to a vote of

the electors ......
'4
Conn. -, 161 A.2d 770 (1960).
15 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

plaintiffs were not members of a class
which was allegedly denied such protection.
The next contention advanced was that
the statute violated the state constitution
in that it authorized the expenditure of
public funds for a private purpose. The
Court rejected this claim. 16 Plaintiffs' main
argument centered around a state constitutional article which states in part: "[N]o
person shall by law be compelled to join
or support. . . any congregation, church or
religious association."'1 7 Plaintiffs contended that the use of tax-derived public
funds to provide transportation to a school
maintained by a church constituted public
support of that church. The Court held
that the statute aided the parents and the
children, preserved the public health, safety
and welfare and fostered education. The
statute came up to, but did not breach,
the wall of separation between church and
state.' 8 Plaintiffs' final argument was that
the funds used to implement the statute
were restricted by the state constitution
to public school use. 19 On this point, the
16 Snyder v. Town of Newtown, supra note 14,
at __ 161 A.2d at 774. The Court found that since
the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Federal Constitution and the Connecticut constitution had substantially the same meaning, the
words of the United States Supreme Court were
appropriate on this matter. "It is much too late
to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the
opportunity of children to get a secular education
serves no public purpose." Ibid. See Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
17
CONN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
18 Snyder v. Town of Newton, supra note 14,
at

__,

161 A.2d at 775-79. The Court reviewed

the history of the church-state relationship in
Connecticut and reached its conclusion while relying heavily on the reasoning in the Everson decision.
19 CONN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2. This section of the
constitution established a school fund,

".

. . the

interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated

6
Court agreed and ruled that the statute in
question, in so far as it purported to make
available moneys from this school fund,
was unconstitutional.
It is no doubt significant that the Connecticut Court discussed the federal issues,
the "private purpose" issue and the "support of religion" issue and found that the
statute was not objectionable on these
grounds before it ruled the statute unconstitutional on the ground of the improper
use of public school funds. The Court
could have declared the statute unconstitutional without discussing these other factors. It would appear, therefore, that if
legislation were enacted specifically appropriating funds from sources not limited
to public school use, the Connecticut Court
20
would find the statute constitutional.
In Board of Educ. v. Allen,21 the Commissioner of Education of the State of
New York ordered a school district, as
provided by statute, to expend public funds
to provide transportation of pupils to parochial schools. 22 The Board of Education,
to the support and encouragement of the public,
or common schools .. "
20 Cf. Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151,
-,
153 A.2d 80, 87 (1959). The Maine Court,
while declaring certain practices involving transportation to private schools unlawful in the absence of statutory provisions, observed that a
properly worded statute could meet both state
and federal constitutional standards.
21 17 Misc.2d 1080, 192 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
22 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3635, 1807. Section 3635
establishes the criteria of the remoteness of the
child's home from the school or the welfare of
the child as the standard for determining when
transportation should be provided. This section
also permits a parent to appeal an adverse vote
by a school district on such matters to the Commissioner of Education. Section 1807 empowers
the Commissioner to order the local district to
provide moneys for transportation if in his judgment the criteria established in § 3635 so require.
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in contesting the order, maintained that the
Federal Constitution as well as the state
constitution had been violated.23 The Court
ruled that on the strength of the Everson
decision, there was no violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Federal Constitution. The Court's handling
of the petitioner's claims under the state
constitution requires some historical background. In 1938, the New York Court of
24
Appeals, in Judd v. Board of Educ.,
ruled that the expenditure of public funds
to provide bus transportation to a parochial
school, pursuant to a state statute, constituted support of a school wholly or partially under religious control and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. In the election
of that year the voters of the state approved
an amendment to the constitution which
read in part, "[T]he legislature may provide for the transportation of children to
and from any school or institution of learning.",25 Despite this amendment, the Board
of Education, in the Allen case, 26 attacked
the orders of the Commissioner of Education as being violative of the state constitution. In dismissing the petition, the Court
stated that the Board was placing undue
emphasis on the Judd case 27 in view of the
subsequent constitutional amendment. The
Court observed, "[T] he People of the State
of New York have determined that the use
of public funds for transportation to nonpublic schools is a constitutional expendi23 Since the Court's opinion is rather brief, the
precise state and federal constitutional questions
are not clearly defined.
94278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
'5 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 4. (Emphasis added.)
20 Board. of Educ. v. Allen, 17 Misc.2d 1080,
192 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
27 Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.
2d 576 (1938).
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ture." 28
In the third case mentioned in Mr.
Reed's article, the City of Augusta, Maine,
enacted an ordinance to provide transportation for pupils attending nonpublic
schools. 29 Taxpayers brought suit against
the city contending that neither the Maine
statutes nor the Augusta city charter conferred this power on the city.30 Plaintiffs
further contended that the ordinance violated the state and federal constitutions.
All parties agreed that no express terms
in the statutes or the city charter granted
the city the power to adopt such an ordinance. The city maintained that the enactment of such an ordinance was an exercise
of its police power. The Court agreed that
the city had the authority to exercise the
police power but that the use of this police
power must be consistent with the public
policy of the state.31 A review of the state
education laws led the Court to the conclusion that since the expenditure by municipalities of public funds for education, in all
its phases, had for over one hundred years
28 Board of Educ. v. Allen, supra note 26, at 1082,

192 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
29
An ordinance of the city of Augusta authorized the mayor to make a one year contract to
provide transportation for Augusta children attending nonpublic schools. The purpose of the
ordinance was stated to be to conserve the health,
safety and welfare of the children. Money was
appropriated for this project from the city's contingent fund. See Squires v. City of Augusta, 155
Me. 151, __, 153 A.2d 80, 81-82 (1959).
30 Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153
A.2d 80 (1959).
31 id. at -,
153 A.2d at 88-89. A municipality
cannot under its general grant of power from the
state enact ordinances which are repugnant to the
policy of the state. Where the state has clearly
determined the public policy on a subject through
legislation, a municipality cannot act contrary to
or in qualification of that policy. 5 McQUILLIN,

MuNICiPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 15.21 (3d ed. 1949).

been authorized by the legislature in specific and definite terms, it was the public
policy of the state that a city ordinance
such as the one under consideration could
be enacted only after clear and unmistakable authorization by the legislature. Since
the city's exercise of the police power was
inconsistent with the general education
policy of the state, the Court ruled that
the city's expenditure of public funds for
the transportation of children to nonpublic
schools was unlawful.
Although a decision was reached in this
case before considering any of the constitutional questions, the Court specifically
stated that a properly worded enabling act
authorizing communities to spend funds to
transport children to private schools would
meet both federal and state constitutional
32
requirements.
In addition to these three cases referred
to by Mr. Reed, there have been other developments of interest. Kentucky was cited
by Mr. Reed as being an example of a
state whose courts had upheld the constitutionality of public transportation to nonpublic schools because the legislature had
enacted a proper enabling act and had
utilized only a general fund to pay for the
transportation.33 Despite what would appear to be now simply a routine matter for
school boards, the Kentucky courts are
still required to formulate rules in the bus
transportation area. In 1956 the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky had to decide how
to apportion the bus transportation expenses between the public school fund and
See Squires v. City of Augusta, supra note 30,
at -, 153 A.2d at 87 (dictum).
38 Reed, The School Bus Challenge, 5 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 99, 102-03 (Spring 1959).
32
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the general fund.3 4 The court ruled that
a simple per capita basis should be used
unless peculiar or unusual circumstances
existed. The same court was asked, in
1960, to define "peculiar or unusual circumstances. '35 The court, although not
answering the request, stated that since
its only concern was to make certain that
no public school money was expended for
the nonpublic buses and that a straight per
capita method came closest to assuring
this goal, it would again direct that the per
capita basis be used.
The New York State Legislature has
amended, effective September 1, 1961, a
section of the Education Law dealing with
bus transportation. 6 The effect of this
amendment is to make it mandatory for
school districts to provide bus transportation to both public and private schools for
grade school students who reside at distances of from two to ten miles from
school and for high school students who
reside at distances of from three to ten
miles from school.37 Under the existing
law, if the local school district does not
provide transportation for school children,
an appeal can be taken to the Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner
Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956).
In addition to the bus issue, the constitutionality
of using public funds to pay the salaries of Roman
Catholic nuns teaching in the public schools and
to lease buildings owned by the Roman Catholic
Church for public school use was questioned. The
court found no violation in these practices.
35 See Board of Educ. v. Jefferson County, 333
S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1960).
36
N.Y. EDUc. LAW §3635 (Supp. 1960).
37 The operation of the existing bus transportation law and the probable effects of the amendment are discussed in a memorandum by the
State Education Department and a message from
the governor upon the signing of the amendment.
McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1925, 2067 (1960).
34
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will order the school district to provide
transportation for the children to the
schools they legally attend if such transportation is being provided for some of the
children in the district or if the school
district's refusal to provide the transportation is unreasonable considering either the
remoteness of the pupil's home or the best
interests of the child.38 In practice the
Commissioner generally ordered transportation to both public and private schools
39
to a maximum distance of eight miles.
The amendment will not only codify what
had become the general policy of the Commissioner of Education, but also, will simplify the appeal procedure and extend the
maximum limit of coverage from the previously established eight miles, to ten
miles.

40

From the above discussion, it is clear
that since the Everson decision, 41 a state
38 Ibid. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3635.
39 See, e.g., Matter of Patnaude, 74 State Dep't
(N.Y. Educ.) 46 (1953). A school district was
providing transportation for the public school
pupils. The Commissioner ruled that "in accordance with the established precedent, the pupils
attending parochial schools are entitled to transportation provided they are attending the nearest
available school of their denomination and such
school is more than two miles from their homes
in the case of elementary pupils or more than
three miles distant in the case of secondary pupils,
except that school districts are not required to
provide transportation where the school is eight
miles or more." (Emphasis added.) The standards of distance were established by the Commissioner's rulings not by statute.
Matter of the Towns of Hempstead and North
Hempstead, 73 State Dep't (N.Y. Educ.) 25
(1952). The Commissioner ruled that "where the
distance involved exceeds three miles but is less
than eight, it becomes the duty of the school
meeting to authorize transportation for children
who attend non-public schools."
40 See note 39 supra.
41 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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court cannot declare a statute providing
for the transportation of pupils to sectarian
schools violative of the Federal Constitution on the ground that expenditure of public funds for such a purpose would constitute the support of a religion. However,
since state courts of last resort are the final
judges of the effect of state constitutional
provisions, an invalidation could arise on
that basis. The Supreme Court of Washington made such a decision only two years
after the Everson case.42 Parents sought a
writ of mandamus from the Washington
Court ordering a school district to provide
transportation for their children to a sectarian school. The parents contended that
under a state statute all children, attending
school in accordance with the state's compulsory attendance laws, were entitled to
use the transportation facilities currently
43
being provided by the school district.
They alleged that since their school district provided transportation for the public
school children, the statute required that
the district extend the service to the parochial school students. To answer the objection that public school funds could be expended only for public school expenses,
the plaintiffs alleged that funds other than
the public school funds were available. The
plaintiffs also alleged that if transportation were denied them, their rights under
the First Amendment would be abridged.
The Court disposed of the Federal Constitutional question on the strength of the
Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33
Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
42

REV. CODE § 28.24.060 (1956).
"All
children attending school in accordance with the
laws relating to compulsory attendance shall be
entitled to use the transportation facilities provided by the school district in which they reside."
Ibid.
43 WASH.

majority opinion in the Everson case in
which Justice Black stated that a state
could, if it wished, provide transportation
only to public school children. 44 The Court
agreed that the language of the statute did
apply to children attending parochial school
but that the main issue was whether public
funds could be constitutionally expended
for such a purpose. The state constitution
provided that no public funds could be appropriated for the support of a religious
establishment and that schools maintained
in whole or in part by public funds must be
45
free from sectarian control.
The Court, in discussing whether such
expenditure as was requested would constitute support of a religion, stated: "[W]e
must . . . respectfully disagree with those
portions of the Everson majority opinion
which might be construed, in the abstract,
as stating that transportation, furnished at
public expense, to children attending religious schools, is not in support of such
school. . . . [W]e are constrained to hold
that the Washington constitution although
based upon the same precepts [as the First
Amendment], is a clear denial of the rights
herein asserted by appellants. '46 The Court,
contrary to the conclusion reached in the

44 Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 41, at 16.

§ 11. This section reads,
in part, "Absolute freedom of conscience in all
matters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual....
No public money or property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment ..
" Ibid.
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4. "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the
public funds shall be forever free from sectarian
control or influence." Ibid.
46 Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., supra
note 42, at -, 207 P.2d at 205.
45 WASH. CONST. art. I,

6
Everson case, ruled that providing transportation of pupils to parochial schools constituted support of that religion and denied
47
the writ.
Although the courts of several states

have declared certain practices involved
in nonpublic school bus transportation unconstitutional, they have stated in several

instances that the operation itself is funda47 See Perry v. School Dist., -

Wash.2d -,
344
P.2d 1036 (1959). The Washington court igain
was called upon to interpret articles I and IX of
the state constitution. The release-time program
for religious education off the school grounds was
ruled unconstitutional. Teachers and representatives of religious groups distributed cards and
made explanatory announcements for the purpose
of obtaining parental consent prior to a child's
participation in the program. The court found the
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mentally constitutional and can be operated in a lawful manner. On the other
hand, some courts have been unable to
sustain such practices in light of their constitutions. In the latter instances, a constitutional amendment may be the only answer for those desiring publicly financed
transportation for nonpublic school children.
practice was a "use of school facilities supported
by public funds for the promotion of a religious
program, which contravenes Art. I, § 11....
This
practice has the further effect of influencing the
pupils, while assembled in the classrooms, as a
,captive audience' to participate in a religious
program, contrary to the express provisions of
Art. IX, § 4 ..
" Id. at __, 344 P.2d at 1043.
Although this program had been in operation
since 1938, the Washington court had not previously passed on it.

